choice is incorrect. The Shapley value, one game-theory-solution concept, is considered an equity solution (Rapoport 1970:48) . In this article, game theory is incorporated into the literature of exchange in negatively connected networks, not only because it can predict patterns of exchange in negatively connected networks but also because game theory allows for insights into the implications of the structures of networks that current models are not sensitive to. This study is intended to show that game-theory-solution concepts do as good a job, if not better, than existing algorithms in predicting who will get more points in exchanges and who exchanges with whom. In addition, it shows that incorporating game theory into the discussion allows for a more insightful investigation of exchange networks.
COOK AND EMERSON
By incorporating networks into exchange theory, Emerson (1972) was the first to extend exchange theory beyond the dyad. Cook, Emerson, Gillmore, and Yamagishi (1983) developed these ideas further. The purpose of their article was to discover how to "best integrate network-structural principles and powerdependence theory to explain the dynamics of power in exchange networks" (1983:289). They used Emerson's (1972) As an illustration of power differences in negatively connected networks, consider Network I in Figure 1 . Imagine this is a monogamous world and the exchange relation is marriage or dating. 'D'ebbie has two options: 'B'ob and 'E'ddie will bid to make themselves more attractive to her. Since Debbie has alternatives, she is in a more powerful position then the men. All of the algorithms (network and game-theoretic) for determining power in negatively connected networks agree that D is the most powerful person in this simple three-person network.
If we add 'A'lice and 'C'arol to form a more complex network (Network II in Figure 1) , different approaches yield different results. In this network, Bob has options and is no longer completely dependent on Debbie. It is now no longer obvious in which position power is concentrated.
To determine where power is located in a network, Cook et al. (1983) developed an experiment. The experiment placed people in network positions and allowed connected pairs to negotiate over the division of a preset allocation of points. If a pair could agree on a division of points, they would receive the points. Points were later converted to money. The assumption was that people in powerful positions would use that power to obtain more points. Cook et al. (1983) developed a measure to determine network-wide dependence. In Network I in Figure 1 , there is no reduction in the value of the network if either B or E (but not both) is removed. For example, if the value of an agreement between any two connected positions is worth 24 points, then the removal of either position B or E does nothing to reduce the value of the network. If either B or E is available, there is still the potential for a payoff of 24 points. In Cook 's terminology, there would be no reduction in maximum flow (RMF). However, when D leaves the network, no agreements can be made and the value of the network is 0. This means that B and E are dependent on D to complete the transaction and if B is not an active participant nobody profits. Looking at Network II in Figure 1 , where it is possible to make two agreements, the maximum resource flow (MRF) is 48. If B or D or E is removed, for example, the reduction in maximum flow is 24; removing any one of these positions would make it impossible for two agreements to be completed. If either A or C is removed, the RMF is 0, and the network can still achieve a joint value of 48. In graph-theoretic terms, Cook et al. are using point vulnerability to model this process.
One problem with using reduction in maximum flow as the only indication of power is that to exercise power in a network, a person has to remove him/herself entirely from the transaction and accept no exchanges. In other words, by the RMF measure, power can only be expressed at the expense of gain. A better measure of power would give the powerful position the ability to exercise power and still profit in an exchange round. In other words, a powerful position could affect others' power without sacrificing its own profit by removing certain connections and depriving some members of the network of the benefit of its value while keeping other options open. Cook, Gillmore, and Yamagishi (1986) revised their measure by combining the concept of point vulnerability (RMF) with line vulnerability (CRMF), the Cost of RMF. Line vulnerability is the ratio of the minimum number of lines that need to be removed in order for a position to exercise power and its total number of connections.
The final measure is known as DNi. CRMFi = (Number of lines that need to be removed to exercise power to its potential) / (Number of lines connected to point i). DNi = RMFi X (1 -CRMFi).
As an illustration of how this is computed, observe the distribution of power in Network II of Coalition rationality is the same assumption with respect to coalitions; no set of actors S will accept less in total than what they can earn in a coalition together.
liesxi > v(S) for all S C N
Finally, group rationality is the assumption that the set of all actors, the grand coalition, will maximize their total reward. All the theories discussed will assume individual rationality. How important or predictive the other types of rationality are will be a contribution of this experiment.
The Core
Intuitively, the Core is the "the set of all feasible outcomes that no coalition can improve upon" (Lloyd Shapley, personal communication, October, 1989) . No group of players will accept an outcome if by forming a coalition they can do better. Formally, the core consists of outcomes that have individual, coalition, and group rationality.
The importance of a core for the experiments described above is that Cook et al. and Markovsky et al. assume that their networks will reach an equilibrium. Cook et al. assume that over time, the more powerful members of networks will exercise their power over the others and eventually an equilibrium will be reached. Once this is obtained, Cook et al. predict that the values will remain the same. Markovsky et al. predict that, based on their axioms, a group of rational actors will quickly decide how to "ration" the points. They also predict an equilibrium.
The game theorist would have to look at the characteristic function of the network game to decide if there is a core before making predictions about reaching an equilibrium. If there is a core, the game theorist would predict that, once a core solution is stumbled upon, it is unlikely that any individual or coalition would be willing and able to produce a disruptive change. If there is no core, the game theorist would have no reason to expect that the game would ever be stable.
Network IV in Figure 1 is an example of a network without a core. If all the pairings have the same value, the network is unstable for the following reason: If A agrees to exchange with B, then C is excluded and receives no points. C would want to improve his/her situation and receive more than zero points so C would make an offer to either A or B that promised more points than the other exchange. If either A or B would agree to exchange with C, the other would receive no points. If B was excluded, B would then make an offer to either C or A that would improve their take. This could go on forever. The excluded person, by offering a player engaged in an exchange more than s/he would receive in that exchange, could cause the coalition to unravel. When there is no solution that some player or set of players cannot improve on, there is no core. When there is no core, there should be no expectation of stability. If there is no core, it would be difficult to decide if any position could exercise power and command resources.
To compute the core, the characteristic function is plugged into the equations for rationality. The objective is to find a solution that is simultaneously individually, coalition-and group-rational. For Network I in Figure 1 The Kernel
Unlike the core and the Shapley value, which assume that any coalition structure that forms will be group-rational, the kernel makes no predictions about which coalitions will form and does not assume group rationality. The kernel predicts only the distribution of rewards, given some assumption about the memberships of all coalitions (Kahan and Rapoport 1984:128-134).
To calculate the kernel, we assume a complete coalition structure and a hypothetical distribution of rewards within each coalition. We then ask whether this distribution is in the kernel. Consider two players k and 1 in the same coalition. In this context, it means that the two players have agreed to trade with one another. Both k and 1 consider alternative trading partners. The maximum surplus of k over 1, SkJ is the maximum increase in reward to k and to any alternative trading partner j with respect to the present distribution if k and j agree to trade. Similarly, slk is the maximum increase in reward to 1 and some alternative trading partner j with respect to the present distribution of rewards if 1 were to agree to trade with j. A reward distribution is in the kernel if ski = sk for every pair of players who are trading.
The appeal of the kernel is that it might model the way players in these networks actually determine how much they are willing to ask. In Network I in Figure 1 
THE EXPERIMENT
As subjects arrived, they were ushered into private cubicles with terminals. They were asked to sign a human subject's release briefly describing the experiment and to wait until the experimenter returned. When all the subjects had arrived, the experimenter went to each cubicle with index cards that were to be selected by the subjects to determine their network position. In this way, the subject's position in the network was randomly determined. The experimenter then started the terminal and gave brief verbal instructions on how to progress through the instructions and to notify the experimenter in the event of a computer malfunction or some other problem. After all the subjects had been oriented in this way, the experimenter observed the transactions from the control room. The game commenced when all subjects completed the instructions. There were three networks: the four-person chain (Network III in Figure 1) 
, the five-person T (Network II), and the five-person hourglass (Network V).
There were 10 sessions for each of the networks. Each session was divided into a series of games. The number of games per session varied. Each group played as many games as it could conclude in one hour. Each game consisted of from one to five rounds where bargaining occurred. Each round consisted of three stages: the offer stage, the acceptance stage, and the confirmation stage.
To avoid confusion, a rigid structure was developed within which subjects could bargain that would ensure no subject could make more then one agreement per game. In the first stage, subjects could made offers to all eligible (connected) positions. At the next stage, all subjects were informed regarding who made them offers and reminded what offers they had made. They would then either allow the offers they had made to stand, keeping them available to other subjects, or they would accept an offer. If they accepted an offer, their standing offers were nullified. The last phase of the round was the confirmation stage. At this phase, the person who made the offer could either chose among competing offers or decide not to confirm any offers. This guaranteed that each person made at most one exchange, and it gave the one making an offer a chance, in a game, to rethink his/ her original offer. If a dyad agreed, they sat out subsequent rounds until the end of the game. All subjects were informed of which positions were no longer eligible. Subsequent rounds continued so that players could negotiate an agreement until either all players were ineligible or five rounds had been completed. At the end of a game, if there was time remaining, another game commenced.
RESULTS
For each of the three networks in the experiment, we examine who traded with whom and which positions had the most power (earned the most points) in exchanges. The average percent of games in which B and D traded was 13 percent. This is less than 1/6, but not significantly so. In eight of the ten groups, the proportion of games with B-D trades was less than 1/6. The failure to achieve significance is largely due to one outlying group. In this group, 54 percent of the games involved B-D exchanges. Using a one-tailed sign test, the null hypotheses that the probability of B-D trades is greater than or equal to 1/6 can be rejected at the almost significant .056 level.
Who Gets More?
The predictions of the theories are as follows: Table 5 The Shapley value predicts differences between the positions, but the differences could be either due to C being included in more exchanges or because it gets more in each exchange; the Shapley value does not tell us which is the case. However, position C cannot average 12.8 without earning more than half the points in exchanges with A, B, D, or E. The core makes no prediction. The kernel, Power/ Dependence, and Elementary Theory all predict equal exchanges.
The three theories predicting equal exchange are wrong in this instance. On average, C earned 3.79 more points than his/her trading partners, and this difference is significant (a < .05, one-tailed t-test with df = 9). This is consistent with the predictions of the Shapley value.
It was also suggested that coreless groups should be less stable in their coalition pattern. A reasonable measure of instability would be the proportion of games in which the group changed its coalition pattern. Unfortunately, these experimental groups did not play enough games to estimate the stability of coalition patterns. An examination of this issue will require experiments in which groups play more games.
CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this article was to show that there is a utility in incorporating game theory into the discussion of exchange in negatively connected networks. This was achieved. The game-theory models did at least as well as the exchangetheory models. In addition, there is much that game theory can contribute to an understanding of the processes that the exchange-theory solutions are insensitive to. Not only was it as successful at correctly predicting where power was located in negatively connected networks than either of the exchange-theory predictions, but it also provides a basis for deciding when there are any stable power relations to predict; coreless games should not have stable power relations. Table 6 is a summary of the performance of the different solutions. A plus "+" symbol shows that the theory was confirmed. A minus "-" means that the theory's predictions were incorrect, a plus/minus shows that the theory made both correct and incorrect predictions. The symbol "---" shows that the theory made no prediction.
The first network, the four-person chain, confirmed the predictions of both the game-theory-solution and power/dependence theories. Elementary theory was inaccurate in its prediction regarding which positions would exchange and which positions would be powerful. All the theories did about equally well on the fiveperson T network. There were the fewest successful predictions about the figure without a core, the hourglass. In many instances, no predictions were made, and in other cases, the predictions were incorrect. As measured by the proportion of sucessful predictions (where ? counts as half a success), the only completely successful theory is the core, closely followed by the Shapley value. Elementary Theory was the least successful. The main point we wish to make is that both the major sociological approaches to exchange networks, Cook's and Markovsky's, do assume rational behavior. Game theory offers a variety of sophisticated rational-choice models for exchange networks that perform at least as well and are worthy of further exploration.
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2. The Shapley value assumes complete "interpersonal transfer of utility." This means that any coalition can split its value between its members in any way. This is not true in these exchange networks. For example, in network III, v(ABCD) = 48, but A = B = C = 0, D = 48 is impossible. This means that sometimes (for example, Network II), the Shapley value cannot occur. Our experience is that this is not a major problem in its application as an ordinary measure of power.
3. In the baseline model, each position chooses randomly from its alternative trading partners. Reciprocated choices produce exchanges. Positions that exchange are removed from the network and choices are made by the remaining positions from the reduced graph. A game ends when no additional exchanges can be made.
